























The surge in Colombian sovereign international bond issues during the 1990s has created 
an increasing need for the Colombian Government and the Banco de la República to 
understand the dynamics and the determinants of the sovereign spread.  This is the first 
comprehensive study of the Colombian sovereign spread and its determinants.  It shows 
that contagion and spillovers play an important part in the determination of the spread, 
particularly in the short term.  A study of daily spread changes between 1998 and 2003 
using an OLS regression framework finds contagion, changes in the US stock market and 
changes in the Colombian exchange rate to significantly influence the spread.  A study of 
the long-term determinants of the spread uses a Johansen framework of multivariate 
cointegration together with monthly data from 1998 to 2002, and finds exports, the 
exchange rate, the economic growth rate and the US T-Bill rate as significant explanatory 
variables of the spread.  A weakness of the study, as with all single-country studies, is 
that the time period is too short to study variables published only with annual frequency, 
and some such variables have, indeed, by cross-country studies been shown to 
significantly influence the spread.  Such variables include, for example, the debt ratio and 
the debt-service ratio. 
 
 
                                                 
* The opinions expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily of the Banco de la República, the 
Colombian Central Bank, nor of its Board of Directors.   I express my thanks to Mauricio Avella, and Luis 
Fernando Melo for helpful comments and suggestions.  Any remaining errors are my own.   2
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1  Introduction 
 
In line with many other emerging markets, Colombian sovereign bond issues surged 
during the 1990s.  By the end of 2002, Colombia had a total outstanding public external 
debt
1 of USD 22.2 billion.  Of this some USD 11.5 billion was bonds, a figure that 
increased rapidly during the 1990s, both in absolute terms an in relation to total public 
external debt, as illustrated by figure 1.1. 
 
The increasing importance of international bonds as a public debt instrument has 
generated a rising need for both the Colombian Government and the Banco de la 
República to understand what factors determine bond yields and, therefore, also spreads. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Colombian external public debt 1990 – 2002 (USD billion)  
 
 
Source: Banco de la República 
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This is the first comprehensive study of the Colombian sovereign spread, i.e. the spread 
between the yield of Colombian sovereign issues and that of US Treasuries of the same 
maturity.  We are here both studying the short-term determinants and the longer-term 
determinants of the sovereign spread, using data from the beginning of 1998 up until mid 
2003. 
 
For the study of the short-term determinants we are using daily data in differential form 
together with an OLS regression framework.  The results of this study suggest that the 
daily spread changes are influenced by the change in the spread of other emerging 
markets, the change in the S&P 500 stock market index, and by the change in the 
Colombian exchange rate. 
 
The study of the long-term determinants of the spread uses a Johansen framework of 
multivariate cointegration together with monthly data.  Exports, the exchange rate, the 
economic growth rate and the US T-Bill rate all shows up as significant explanatory 
variables of the sovereign spread. 
 
A weakness of this study, as well as of most single country studies of emerging market 
spreads, is that the time period studied is relatively short, in this case spanning 1998 to 
2003.  This implies that many potential explanatory variables have to be omitted from the 
study, since they are only published with annual frequency.  Some such variables have 
been found to have a significant impact on the spread in cross-country studies.  These 
include, for example, debt ratios and debt-service ratios.
2 The time period does, 
furthermore, not include a full business cycle, so the effect of cyclical variables on the 
spread cannot be properly studied. 
 
In addition the paper also discusses the rating history of Colombia as well as the 
influence of contagion and spillovers on the Colombian spread.  With the surge in 
emerging market debt issues, the demand for sovereign credit ratings has increased 
                                                 
2 Such as the debt-to-GDP ratio, the debt-to-exports ratio and the debt-service-to-GDP ratio.  See, for 
example, Rowland (2004), and Rowland and Torres (2004).   5
substantially during the 1990s.  We are in this paper discussing the Colombian sovereign 
rating history based on the ratings by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, the two main 
credit rating agencies, and what lead them to upgrade or downgrade Colombia’s rating. 
 
Contagion and spillovers has played an important part in the determination of the 
Colombian spread.  Between mid-2002 and mid-2003 the correlation between the daily 
Colombian spread and that of emerging markets in general was as high as 0.94.  The 
correlation has, nevertheless, varied significantly over time, and has during periods even 
been negative. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: Chapter 2 discusses emerging market debt in general.  
It analyses valuation of emerging market issues in order to build an understanding for 
potential determinants of the spread.  This chapter also discusses the relevant literature of 
the area.  Chapter 3 continues by discussing the Colombian sovereigns spread.   
Colombia’s rating history is also examined, and a section is devoted to the identification 
of the potential determinants of the spread.  In chapter 4 the influence of contagion on the 
spread is analysed.  Chapters 5 and 6 continue with the empirical studies of the 
determinants of the spread.  In chapter 5 the explanatory variables of the daily spread 
changes are determined, and in chapter 6 a Johansen framework is used to identify some 
long-term determinants of the spread.  Chapter 7 concludes the paper. 
 
   6
2  Determinants of Emerging Market Sovereign Spreads 
 
In order to identify the potential determinants of the sovereign spread, it is important to 
understand how emerging market bonds are valued.  Section 2.1 starts by discussing 
emerging market debt in general and some fundamental definitions.  This section also 
examines the recent spread history of emerging market debt.  In section 2.2 the process of 
valuation of emerging market debt is discussed.  Section 2.3 contains a survey of the 
literature on the determinants of emerging market sovereign spreads. 
 
 
2.1   Emerging Market Sovereign Debt 
 
Emerging market debt was hardly traded at all before the 1990s.
3  While banks held 97 
percent of all emerging market debt at the end of the 1980s, their share had fallen to less 
than two thirds by the mid-1990s.
4 The change was initiated by Mexico launching its 
Aztec bond in March 1988.
5 This was followed by the Brady Plan in 1989, which was a 
programme initiated by the US government, to allow emerging markets to issue bonds in 
exchange for rescheduled bank loans.  The so-called Brady bonds were partly 
collateralised by US Treasuries.  The first country to reach a Brady agreement was 
Mexico, and Mexico has since then been used as a benchmark for pricing emerging 
market debt.  A total of 17 countries have taken advantage of the programme, with a 
cumulative face value of USD 170 billion of Brady bonds issued.
6 
                                                 
3 Latin America had large traded debt issues in the 1920s. However, with the Great Depression and 
following debt defaults, Latin American traded debt almost completely disappeared.  See, for example, 
Eichengreen and Portes (1986). 
4 Eichengreen and Mody (1998), p. 7. 
5 This was a 20-year USD 2.6 billion issue in exchange for rescheduled bank loans.  Its principal was fully 
collateralised with special purpose bonds issued by the US Treasury. 
6 See Sachar-Brauer and Chen (2001) for an introduction to Brady bonds.   7
The Brady bonds transformed the market from sovereign debt ownership concentrated in 
the hands of a few creditor banks and dealers to ownership distributed more widely 
through an actively traded and liquid Brady bond market.  This also opened the doors for 
emerging market eurobond issues.  Emerging market bonds are today a common 
component of the portfolios of institutional fixed income investors. 
 
Colombia has in modern times not defaulted on its sovereign debt, and has, therefore, 
never issued any Brady bonds.
7  It has, nevertheless, a number of outstanding eurobond 
issues. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the development of JP Morgan’s EMBI Global total-return index from 
1994 and up until now.  Figure 2.2 shows the EMBI Global spread composite from 1998 
up until present. 
                                                 
7 Colombia did, indeed, default on its sovereign debt in the 1930s together with most other Latin American 
sovereign issuers, but has not defaulted since then.   8
Figure 2.1: EMBI Global total-return index 1994 – 2003 (31 December 1993 = 100) 
 
 









































































Figure 2.2: EMBI Global Spreads 1998 – 2003 (basis points) 
 
 















































2.2   Valuation of Emerging Market Issues 
 
When analysing emerging market bonds, it is completely crucial to understand how these 
bonds are priced by investors, as well as the fundamental differences between sovereign 
and corporate debt. 
 
Corporate debt, particularly high yield debt,
8 can be priced using option theory.  We let D 
represent the market value of the corporation’s debt, which is the promise to pay the face 
value F of the debt in t years.  We, furthermore define S as the market value of the firm’s 




  A = D + S          (2.1) 
 
Given this structure, the firm’s common stock can, indeed, be interpreted as a call option 
on its assets with an exercise price of F and an expiration time t.  When the debt matures, 
the stockholders have the choice either to pay the face value F of the bond to the 
creditors, which would represent to exercise the call option, or to default on the debt and 
let the creditors take control of the assets of the firm, which would represent not 
exercising the option.  Option pricing theory can now be used to value the common stock 
S of the company,
10 and the value of the debt can be calculated using equation (2.1). 
 
The valuation of sovereign debt is not as straight forward, which has to do with the 
difference in default procedures involving corporate and sovereign debt respectively.  A 
firm normally defaults on its debt when the value of its common stock falls to zero, and 
the firm, therefore, turns insolvent.  It goes into bankruptcy proceedings whereby control 
of its assets is transferred to its creditors.  If the firm is liquidated, the assets are sold and 
the proceedings divided by the creditors according to well-defined rules. 
                                                 
8 High yield is also referred to as speculative grade as well as, informally, as junk bonds. 
9 Modigliani and Miller (1958) in their seminal paper stated that the value of a firm should be independent 
of its capital structure.   11
 
The default of a sovereign debtor is much more complicated.
11 Sovereign default risk is 
related to both the issuer’s ability to pay and its willingness to pay, as illustrated by figure 
2.3.  A sovereign does, furthermore, not have a well-defined asset base, and the creditors 
normally have very limited possibility to take control of any assets of the sovereign.
12 
When a sovereign defaults, its debt is normally restructured through lengthy negotiations 
with its creditors, and the outcome of any such negotiations can be hard to predict.  No 
clear framework for sovereign default proceedings is in place, and a sovereign default is 
normally a very complicated affair.
13 
 
Even if outright sovereign defaults driven strictly by political considerations are very 
rare,
14 the perceived willingness of a sovereign government to pay plays an important 
role in assessing the default risk and, thereby, also the value of sovereign debt.  A 
sovereign default is largely a political decision.  In relation to the Russian default of 
1998, Deutche Bank wrote: “We continue to maintain that a default depends far more on 
Russia’s willingness to pay versus its ability to pay its debt”.
15 When a sovereign 
defaults, the government has normally traded off the cost of servicing the current debt
                                                                                                                                                   
10 Normally the Black and Scholes option pricing model.  See, for example, Hull (2002) for a derivation. 
11 The complexity of strategic issues involved in lending to a sovereign nation has been discussed in a rich 
theoretical literature started by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).  See also Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986), 
as well as, for a less formalised analysis, Eaton and Taylor (1986). 
12 For this reason, option-pricing models are not very useful in valuing sovereign debt.  Claessens and van 
Wijnbergen (1993), nevertheless, use option theory to price the bonds of the Mexican Brady deal.  The 
value of the asset base A for a sovereign is not well defined, and Claessens and van Wijnbergen assume a 
stochastic behaviour for the value correspondent to A.  They assume a Brownian motion even if there is no 
clear evidence for such behaviour of the underlying stochastic element.  The model does, furthermore, 
neither take into account the behaviour of fundamental economic variables, nor any contagion effects.  In 
spite of this, the paper offers some interesting theoretical insights. 
13 The IMF, among others, has been promoting the definition of a framework of clear sovereign 
restructuring proceedings, but so far no such framework has been agreed upon.  Even if such a framework 
would be implemented, it would not cover bonds currently outstanding, only new issues.  See Krueger 
(2002) for a suggestion and discussion of such a framework. 
14 In this century, there have been only four major cases of sovereign default driven strictly by politics or 
ideology.  In 1917, the Bolshevik government of Russia repudiated foreign obligations of the tsar.  In 1934, 
Adolf Hitler repudiated much of Germany’s obligations under the Versailles Treaty.  Japan followed a 
similar path in 1941, as did communist China in 1949.  Vine (2001). 
15 Deutche Bank Research (1998), p. 3.   12

































Source: Vine (2001), p. 525. 
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against the costs of repudiation, of having assets abroad seized and of having 
international trade impeded.
16 These costs are generally not evaluated in strict economic 
terms, but rather in political terms relating to the governments popularity, its chances to 
continue to stay in power, as well as other personal incentives of individual politicians.  A 
sovereign, furthermore, rarely makes an outright default, but instead forces a 
restructuring or renegotiation of its debt, and the same debt may, indeed, be repeatedly 
restructured.
17 The government generally also trades off the costs of defaulting on 
internal versus external debt.  The government’s willingness to pay is, furthermore, in 
general very difficult to estimate. 
 
The sovereign’s ability to pay is more predictable.  Figure 2.3 shows the principle for the 
analysis of the ability to pay as suggested by Vine (2001).
18 The foreign exchange 
reserves are the ultimate foreign currency funds with which the foreign debt is serviced.  
A country that receives a large part of its foreign exchange reserves through foreign 
investment is highly dependent on capital inflows and has only a limited ability to de-
leverage.  Prices on debt of countries with this characteristic tend experience high 
volatility.  If a large part of foreign investment comes as portfolio investment, which tend 
to be short-term, this also increases the volatility.  Direct foreign investment, on the other 
hand, tends to be longer-term, and also has the added benefit of improving the 
productivity of the country’s private sector. 
 
The analysis of exports can provide perhaps the most meaningful insight of the country’s 
ability to pay and its long-term outlook.  Exports are a key source for building foreign 
exchange reserves, and export revenues can provide an opportunity for a country to de-
leverage.  A country that receives a large part of its foreign exchange reserves through 
exports is generally a more stable credit than a country that relies heavily on capital 
inflows.  Analysis of the composition and sustainability of exports is, therefore, 
important.  The composition of exports addresses whether a country exports value-added 
goods or commodities, where the latter generally are much more exposed to price 
                                                 
16 See Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), and Gibson and Sundaresan (1999). 
17 See Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) 
18 Vine (2001), pp. 523ff.   14
fluctuations adding to the volatility of the credit profile.  The sustainability addresses 
whether a country exports because of high productivity or because of cheap labour or an 
undervalued currency.  Generally, countries that have invested in productivity should 
outperform in terms of exports. 
 
Another important factor when evaluating a country’s creditworthiness is the composition 
of its imports, specifically the proportions of consumption, intermediate and capital 
goods.  The credit condition of a country that imports primarily capital goods financed 
with long-term money, such as for example the Asian tigers,
19 would generally be 
stronger than that of a country that imports primarily consumption goods financed with 
short-term money, such as for example Mexico in 1994. 
 
Other indicators analysed by investors when valuing debt includes inflation, the fiscal 
deficit and the gross domestic product.  The rate of inflation is an indicator of the 
government’s discipline as well as its control over fiscal and monetary policy.
20 A large 
fiscal deficit is problematic since it needs to be financed either through domestic or 
foreign borrowing.  If the gross domestic product is contracting, this normally leads to a 
fall in government revenues, further aggravating the fiscal deficit.  The government might 
try to increase revenues through tax increases, which would lead to further economic 
hardship. 
 
In addition, there are many other indicators that influence sovereign creditworthiness.  
Such indicators include political and social stability in the country, unemployment, law 
and order, cooperation between central and provincial governments as well as between 
the different branches of the government, distribution of wealth, and respect for foreign 
investors and for international law.  Another factor that directly influence the perceived 
credit risk is the country’s history of honouring debt obligations.
21 
 
                                                 
19 Hong-Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. 
20 High inflation has in many cases been used by governments to finance large fiscal deficit. 
21 See, for example, Hajivassiliou (1989), and Özler (1993) for a discussion on the past history of 
repayments.   15
The ability of investors to discriminate among emerging market sovereigns and to price 
risk appropriately has been controversial, to say the least.  Some observers emphasise the 
cost involved in acquiring and processing the information relevant to assess a borrower’s 
creditworthiness.
22 Investors, therefore, price debt on the basis of incomplete information 
about the borrowers’ economic and financial circumstances.  This practice generates 
herding and market volatility.
23 
 
Emerging market bonds are normally priced as a spread over the US Treasuries curve.  
However, most emerging market sovereign issues are not investment grade, and they, 
therefore, carry a significant risk.  “Because of the magnitude and nature of this risk, we 
believe a large percentage of emerging market issuers should not be priced in terms of 
spread to Treasuries, but in terms of absolute yield, like domestic high-yield issuers.”
24 
Pricing the bonds off US Treasuries have, indeed, had some obscure effects, such as for 
example the large yield compression of emerging market debt generated by the fall in US 
interest rates in 1993.  This caused large losses for some investors.  The practice of 
pricing emerging market debt off US Treasuries has, nevertheless, continued, and this 
paper will, therefore, study the spread rather than the absolute yield. 
 
 
2.3   Review of Previous Studies 
 
Despite the explosive growth of emerging market debt, there have been few studies of the 
determinants of emerging market sovereign spreads.  This is mainly due to the short time 
series that exist, but also due to the turbulence that these markets have gone through, 
particularly since the Russian crisis in 1998.  Most studies in the area are cross-country 
studies, since many of the fundamental variables determining the sovereign spread only 
exist with annual frequency.   
 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Calvo and Mendoza (1995), and Chari and Kehoe (1997). 
23 See Kinoshita and Mody (1997) for a discussion on herding. 
24 Vine (2001), p. 532.   16
A few studies on individual countries have, nevertheless, been conducted.  These are, 
however, restricted to studying variables that are published with monthly frequency.   
Table 2.1 summarises these studies. 
 
Budina and Mantchev (2000) studied the determinants of the prices of the Bulgarian 
Brady bond issues of 1994,
25 using monthly data from July 1994 to July 1998 in a 
cointegration framework.  They concluded that, in the long run, gross foreign reserves 
and exports had a positive effect on bond prices, and the real exchange rate and Mexico’s 
nominal exchange rate depreciation had a negative effect.  The Mexican exchange rate 
was included to investigate whether Mexico’s economic crisis of 1995 had any contagion 
effects, which the results suggest it had.  In the short run, the Asian crisis of 1997 had a 
negative impact on the bond prices, and the introduction of a currency board exchange 
rate regime in 1998 had a positive impact.  The authors did, however, not find any 
significant influence from variables such as consumer price inflation, the change in 
foreign reserves to imports ratio, or the fiscal deficit. 
 
Nogués and Grandes (2001) conducted an investigation into the determinants of the 
spread of Argentina’s floating rate bond (FRB), one of Argentina’s Brady bond issues.  
They used monthly data from January 1994 to December 1998 and an estimation 
technique developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) to control for stationarity and to 
check for the existence of a long run structural relationship.  Again they include a 
Mexican variable, in this case the EMBI total-return index for Mexican Brady bonds, to 
investigate whether the Mexican crisis had any significant spill-over effect, which they 
concluded it had.  In addition they found the debt-service to export ratio, the GDP growth 
rate,
26 the fiscal balance and the 30-year US Treasury yield all to have significant impact 
on the spread with the right sign, as shown in table 2.1.  They, furthermore, reported a 
significant impact of the resignation of Domingo Cavallo as Minister of Economy in 
1996. 
                                                 
25 Note that they study the bond prices rather than the spread. 
26 The GDP was transformed from quarterly to monthly data using a cubic Spline function.   17
Table 2.1.  Single-country studies of the sovereign spread 
 
Country, Regression Technique and 
Data Sample 
Significant explanatory variables 
Budina and Manchew (2000)   
  
Bulgaria  Gross foreign reserves (-) 
Cointegration framework  Exports (-) 
Monthly data from Jul 1994 to Jul 1998  REER (+) 
  Mexico’s nominal exchange rate (+) 
  
  
Nogués and Grandes (2001)   
  
Argentina  EMBI total-return index Mexico (-) 
Estimation technique: Pesaran et. al. (2001)  External debt service/Exports (+) 
Monthly data from Jan 1994 to Dec 1998  GDP growth rate (-) 
 Fiscal  balance  (-) 
  30-year US Treasury yield (-) 
  
  
Rojas and Jaque (2003)   
  
Chile Short-term  debt/Reserves  (+) 
OLS regression technique  Total external debt/Reserves (+) 
Monthly data from Apr 1999 to Jul 2002  Exports (-) 
  Economic activity (-) 
  US Federal Funds rate (+) 
  
 
Note: Budina and Mantchev (2000) use the bond price rather than the spread as the dependent variable.  
They concluded that, in the long run, gross foreign reserves and exports had a positive effect on bond 
prices, and the real exchange rate and Mexico’s nominal exchange rate depreciation had a negative effect.  
We have in this table switched the signs on the explanatory variables, to make them comparable to the other 
studies.  If a variable has a positive impact on the bond price, it does, indeed, have a negative impact on the 
spread, and vice versa. 
 
 
Rojas and Jaque (2003) studied the development and identified the determinants of the 
Chilean sovereign spread.  They used monthly data from April 1999 to July 2002, and 
found significant impact on the spread of the debt-to-reserves ratio, exports, economic 
activity as well as of US interest rates, as shown in table 2.1.  All the parameter estimates 
were of the right sign.  The result of their estimation might, however, be questionable, 
since they used an OLS regression technique on data that can be assumed to be non-
stationary.  This implies that the validity tests of the parameter statistics are not valid.    18
Using an OLS regression technique on non-stationary variables can, furthermore, lead to 
spurious regressions. 
 
Studies of individual countries suffer from the weakness that they are limited to data, 
which is published monthly.  To study the full set of explanatory variables, of which 
many only are published yearly, a cross-country study must be conducted.  Such a study, 
on the other hand, suffers from the weakness of mixing data from countries with very 
different characteristics, which might seriously bias the results.  Panel data estimation 
techniques go some way in dealing with this problem and are, therefore, preferable to 
simple pooled data techniques.  Table 2.2a and 2.2b summarises the results of the main 
cross-country studies of the spread. 
 
Rowland and Torres (2004) investigated the determinants of the spreads of 16 emerging 
market sovereign issuers, using a panel data technique.  They used annual data from 1998 
up until 2002, and concluded that the GDP growth rate, the external debt-to-GDP ratio, 
the external debt-service-to-GDP ratio, the debt-to-exports ratio, the reserves-to-GDP 
ratio and the exports-to-GDP ratio all had significant influence on the spread with the 
expected sign.  Argentina, Russia and Ecuador were all excluded from the data sample, 
since these countries defaulted during the period, and their bonds, therefore, traded at 
excessive spreads. 
 
Rowland (2004) is a follow-up study to Rowland and Torres (2004).  He investigated the 
determinants of the sovereign spread using an OLS-regression technique.  By using the 
spread as of one recent date (29 July 2003), he was able to increase the number of 
countries studied to 29.  However, this study only found three significant determinants of 
the spread, the GDP growth rate, the GDP per capita and the inflation rate. 
 
   19
Table 2.2a.  Cross-country studies of the sovereign spread 
 
Regression Technique and 
Data Sample 
Significant explanatory variables 
Rowland and Torres (2004)   
  
Panel data technique  GDP growth rate (-) 
16 emerging market sovereign issuers  Total external debt/GDP (+) 
Annual data from 1998 to 2002  Total external debt/Exports (+) 
  Foreign reserves/GDP (-) 
 Exports/GDP  (-) 
  Debt service/GDP (+) 
  
  
Rowland (2004)   
  
OLS regression on pooled data  GDP growth rate (-) 
29 emerging market sovereign issuers  GDP/Capita (-) 
Data as of 29 Jul 2003  CPI inflation (+) 
  
  
Goldman Sachs (Ades et. al. (2000))   
  
Panel data technique  GDP growth rate (-) 
15 emerging market sovereign issuers  Total external amortizations/Reserves (+) 
Monthly data from Jan 1996 to May 2000  Total external debt/GDP (+) 
  Fiscal balance/GDP (-) 
 Exports/GDP  (-) 
  REER misalignment (+) 
 LIBOR  (+) 
  Default history (+) 
  
  
Eichengreen and Mody (1998)   
  
OLS regression on pooled data  Issue size (-) 
Issue spread, 998 emerging market bonds  Private placement (+) 
Both corporate and sovereign issues  Credit worthiness (Institutional Investors) (-) 
Period: 1991-1996  Debt/GDP (+) 
 Debt  service/Exports  (+) 
  
   20
Table 2.2b.  Cross-country studies of the sovereign spread (continued…) 
 
Regression Technique and 
Data Sample 
Significant explanatory variables 
Min (1998)   
  
OLS regression on pooled data  Private issuer (+) 
Dummy variable model  Total external debt/GDP (+) 
Issue spread, 505 emerging market bonds  Foreign reserves/GDP (-) 
Both corporate and sovereign issues  Debt service/Exports (+) 
Period: 1991-1995  Growth rate of imports (+) 
  Growth rate of exports (-) 
  Net foreign assets (-) 
  CPI inflation rate (+) 
 Terms-of-trade  index  (-) 
  Nominal exchange rate adjusted by CPI (+) 
 Maturity  (-) 





Goldman Sachs published a study (Ades et. al. (2000)) into the determinants of emerging 
market spreads, which used monthly data from 15 emerging market economies from 
January 1996 until May 2000 together with a panel data technique.
27 The reason for using 
monthly data is that they developed the model to value emerging market debt, and they 
needed to be able to update these valuations monthly.  As a strategic investment tool, the 
model was reported to outperform the EMBI Global total-return index.  The authors 
found a number of variables to have a significant impact on the sovereign spread, such as 
the GDP growth rate, total external amortizations as a ratio of foreign reserves, the 
external-debt-to-GDP ratio, the fiscal balance, the exports-to-GDP ratio, real exchange 
rate misalignment, international interest rates, and the default history of the country.   
 
Other cross-country studies include Eichengreen and Mody (1998), and Min (1998), 
which are summarised in table 2.2a and 2.2b.  They are using an OLS regression 
technique on pooled data and include both sovereign and corporate emerging market 
issues. 
                                                 
27 They used linear interpolation to transform annual and quarterly data to monthly data where needed, 
which from an econometric standpoint is highly questionable.   21
 
With the surge in international sovereign lending, the demand for sovereign ratings by 
international credit rating agencies has also increased.  If the ratings are assumed to 
properly measure the credit risk, one could expect the determinants of the ratings to be 
similar to the determinants of the spreads.  A seminal paper is Cantor and Packer (1996), 
which investigated the determinants of ratings of the two main rating agencies, Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s, for a cross section of countries.  They used a linear 
transformation on the ratings and found with OLS estimations that the per-capita income, 
GDP growth rate, inflation rate, external debt, economic development and default history 
all are significant in explaining the ratings of 49 developed and developing countries in 
September 1995.  Afonso (2002) complemented the work of Cantor and Packer by not 
only using the linear transformation of the ratings but also a logistic transformation.  He 
used information from 81 developed and developing countries in year 2000.
28 He 
concluded that using the logistic transformation improves the overall adjustment of the 
model and consequently the predictive power of the determinants, especially for the 
countries placed at the top end of the rating scale.  The sharp increase in the number of 
countries rated, allowed Rowland (2004) to investigate the determinants of sovereign 
credit ratings using a sample of developing countries exclusively.  He used the credit 
ratings from 51 developing countries as of end-July 2003.  His results were very similar 
to those of Cantor and Packer despite the fact that he studied developing countries only.  
The results of these studies are summarised in table 2.3. 
 
                                                 
28 Inflation, GDP growth and budget balance were averages of 1998-2000.   22
Table 2.3.  Cross-country studies of the determinants of credit ratings 
 
Regression Technique and 
Data Sample 
Significant explanatory variables 
Cantor and Packer (1996)   
  
OLS regression on pooled data  GDP per capita (+) 
49 developed and developing countries  GDP growth rate (+) 
Data as of 29 Sep 1995  Inflation rate (-) 
 External  debt  (-) 
  Economic development (+) 
  Default history (-) 
  
  
Afonso (2002)   
  
OLS regression on pooled data  GDP per capita (+) 
Linear and logistic transformation of credit ratings  GDP growth rate (+) 
81 developed and developing countries  Inflation rate (-) 
Data as of June 2001  External debt/Exports (-) 
  Economic development (+) 
  Default history (-) 
  
  
Rowland (2004)   
  
OLS regression on pooled data  GDP per capita (+) 
51 developing countries  GDP growth rate (+) 
Data as of end-July 2003  Inflation rate (-) 
  Debt/Current account receivables (-) 
  Foreign reserves/GDP (+) 
  
 
Note: These studies investigate the determinants of the credit ratings.  The parameter estimates will, 
therefore, have the opposite sign of the determinants of the spread.  If a variable has a positive impact on 
the credit rating, it should have a negative impact on the spread and vice versa.  These studies, furthermore, 
use the credit ratings of Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. 
 
 
Another set of literature has studied the impact of sovereign credit rating changes on the 
spread.  These studies have found rating announcements to have a significant influence 
on emerging market sovereign spreads.
29 Cantor and Packer (1996) conclude that “rating 
announcements have a highly significant impact on speculative-grade sovereigns but a 
statistically insignificant effect on investment-grade sovereigns”.
30 
                                                 
29 See, for instance, Cantor and Packer (1996), Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992), and Larraín, Reisen 
and von Maltzan (1997). 
30 Cantor and Packer (1996), p. 47.   23
 
One interesting observation when surveying the earlier studies is that, of the 11 studies 
listed in table 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, only two find the fiscal balance (or fiscal deficit) to have a 
significant impact on the spread or on the credit ratings.  The rest of studies find the fiscal 
balance not to be a significant explanatory variable.
31 This finding might reflect 
endogeneity in fiscal policy.  Countries trying to improve their credit standing may opt 
for more conservative fiscal policies.  Because of this, the fiscal deficit might not show a 
systematic relationship with the spread, although rating agencies and investors may 




                                                 
31 Rojas and Jaque (3002) do not include the fiscal balance in the set of possible explanatory variables and 
do, therefore, not test the significance of this variable.   24
3  The Colombian Sovereign Spread 
 
The objective of this paper is, indeed, to identify the determinants of the Colombian 
sovereign spread and to study its dynamics.  This chapter introduces the spread of 
Colombian sovereign issues and its recent history.  Section 3.1 discusses the Colombian 
sovereign spread between early 1997 and mid-2003.  The yield of Colombian sovereign 
debt, and, therefore, also the spread, should be determined by the risk of default together 
with the level of compensation the market demands to take on this risk.  One measure of 
a country’s default risk is the sovereign credit ratings assigned to it by the main rating 
agencies.  Section 3.2 discusses the credit rating of Colombia and the underlying analysis 
done by the major rating agencies.  Section 3.3 identifies the main potential determinants 
of the sovereign spread.  These variables will be used in the empirical analysis in chapters 
5 and 6. 
 
 
3.1   The Colombian Spread 1997 – 2003 
 
We will throughout this paper use the EMBI
32 Global composites, as calculated by JP 
Morgan, to represent the sovereign spread over US Treasuries.  The EMBI Global 
composites are weighted averages of the spreads of US dollar-denominated individual 
bonds issued by a particular emerging market country.
33 Some studies have selected a 
benchmark bond for each country studied and used its spread, others have looked at the 
spreads of several individual bonds.  Since we are in this study looking at the spread 
related to the risk of a sovereign issuer rather than the spreads of individual bonds, the 
EMBI Global suits our purpose better than using individual bonds.  The EMBI Global 
                                                 
32 Emerging Market Bond Index. 
33 The EMBI Global composite, which was introduced in August 1999, is the most comprehensive 
emerging markets debt benchmark.  It followed the EMBI and EMBI Plus, where the former is a pure 
Brady bond composite, and the latter includes eurobonds as well.  The EMBI Global include, in addition to 
Brady bonds and eurobonds, US dollar-denominated traded loans and local market debt instruments issued 
by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities.  Only issuers from low- and middle-income countries are 
included in the index, and only issues with a time to maturity of 2.5 years or more and a current face value 
outstanding of at least USD 500 million.  The index is calculated as an average weighted by the current   25
composite, furthermore, controls for floating coupons, principal collateral, rolling interest 
guarantees, and other unusual features of the bonds, and it is computed for all the main 
emerging market sovereign issuers, making comparisons easy. 
 
The Colombian sovereign spread, represented by the EMBI Global Colombia composite, 
is graphed in figure 3.1, for the time period from early 1997 to mid-2003.  It is obvious 
from the graph that the spread during this period was subject to two large shocks.  The 
first of these occurred in late 1998, and was driven by the Russian crisis, induced by the 
Russian devaluation of the rouble and the default on parts of its outstanding debt in 
August 1998.  This had a significant impact on the Colombian spread as illustrated by 
figure 3.2.  The second shock occurred in late 2002.  This was mainly due to the 
uncertainty surrounding the Brazilian election in October 2002, when Luiz Ignácio Lula 
da Silva was elected president of the country.  He had, in earlier presidential campaigns, 
threatened to default on the Brazilian debt, but had this time around committed himself to 
service the debt fully.  Fears of his intentions did, nevertheless, remain, and the Brazilian 
spread reached almost 2500 basis points in September 2002.  Colombia was heavily 
influenced by the uncertainties surrounding Brazil, as shown by figure 3.3.  In late 
September and early October, the Colombian spread exceeded 1000 basis points for the 
first time since the Russian crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                   
market capitalisation of the individual issues.  See JP Morgan (1999) for a further discussion on how the 
index is defined.   26
Figure 3.1: The Colombian sovereign spread 1998 – 2003 (basis points) 
 
 






































































Figure 3.2: The Colombian spread versus Russia (basis points) 
 
 




Figure 3.3: The Colombian spread versus Brazil (basis points) 
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An interesting question is why Colombia was so influenced by the events in Brazil, while 
the Argentine default of end-2001 was hardly felt at all.  In December 2001, Argentina 
defaulted on USD 132 billion of its debt, by far the largest sovereign default in history.
34  
This was followed by political chaos on a dimension hard to predict.  Fernando de la Rua 
was replaced as President of the country by Adolfo Rodrigues Saa, who had to resign 
only a week later after widespread riots and infighting within his Peronist party.  Eduardo 
Duhalde took over the presidency in early January 2002.  The Argentine peso, which had 
been fixed to the US dollar at a parity rate of one to one for over a decade, was devalued.  
What was to follow was an unprecedented economic collapse.  In August 2002, The 
Economist wrote: “The economic crisis that struck Argentina last year has deepened into 
one of the worst and most intractable such calamities in living memory”.
35 
 
Argentina had, however, been largely decoupled from the rest of emerging markets, and 
its collapse had little influence on the sovereign spread of other countries, including 
Colombia.  As shown by figure 3.4, the Argentine default, which led to a sharp increase 
in the spread of its bonds, had little influence on the Colombian spread. 
 
                                                 
34 Economist (2003). 
35 Economist (2002).   29
Figure 3.4: The Colombian spread versus Argentina (basis points) 
 
 




Figure 3.5: The Colombian spread versus Mexico and Venezuela (basis points) 
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The Brazilian election in late 2002, on the other hand, had a severe impact on Colombian 
spreads, while hardly effecting the sovereign spreads neither of Mexico nor of Venezuela, 
as shown in figure 3.5.
36 The reason why Colombia was so severely affected was the 
perceived structural similarities of the economies of Brazil and Colombia.
37 Both 
countries had debt-to-GDP ratios of close to 50 percent,
38 compared to 22.9 percent in 
Mexico.  Both Colombia and Brazil were, furthermore, running large fiscal deficits.  In 
2002, the Colombian fiscal deficit reached 5.6 percent of GDP, and in Brazil the 
corresponding figure was 5.5 percent, while in Mexico only 1.8 percent.  This lead many 
analysts to conclude that if Brazil defaulted on its debt, Colombia would be forced to do 
so as well.  It was not until the approval of an IMF agreement with Colombia in late 
September, when spreads started falling. 
 
Figure 3.6 graphs the Colombian spread against the Latin American composite as well as 
the global emerging markets composite.  Contagion is apparent in the graph, and this 
particularly during the Russian crisis in late 1998 and during the Brazilian presidential 
election in late 2002.  Again, the increase in the Latin American as well as the global 
composite in late 2001, due to the Argentine crisis, seems to have had very limited effects 
on the Colombian spread.  We will return to the issue of contagion in chapter 4. 
 
Table 3.1, finally, summarises some statistics on the spreads of Colombia and other Latin 
American countries.  An interesting observation is that issues from both Peru and Panama 




                                                 
36 Note that the sharp increase in Venezuelan spreads during the Russian crisis in late 1998 actually had 
more to do with the election Hugo Chavez as president of the country and his talk about halting the 
servicing of Venezuela’s foreign debt.  Venezuela, nevertheless, continued to service its debt, but spreads 
have remained high due to political instability and uncertainties surrounding Chavez’s intentions. 
37 Fitch (2002b), indeed, concluded that Colombia was more vulnerable to a crisis in Brazil than any other 
major emerging market. 
38 In 2002, Colombia had a debt-to-GDP ratio of 47.0 percent, and for Brazil the figure was 49.9 percent. 
39 Peru is, in fact, rated one notch lower than Colombia by both Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, while 
Moody’s rate Panama one notch above Colombia.   31













S&P       Moody’s
Spread 
26/7/03 
Spread during past 12 months 
Mean         Max.        Min.    Std. Dev. 
Colombia  BB  Ba2  431  674 1076 411  182 
          
Argentina  SD  Ca  4775 5866 7167 4314  715 
Brazil B+  B2  769  1363  2451  683  503 
Chile  A-  Baa1  117 169 260 116  35 
Dominican  Rep  B+  Ba2  611 534 789 416  90 
Ecuador  CCC+  Caa2  1088 1528 2200 1029  306 
El  Salvador BB+  Baa3  327 374 434 294  28 
Mexico  BBB-  Baa2  224 310 442 206  62 
Panama  BB Ba1  350 431 561 340  62 
Peru  BB- Ba3  435 599 893 370 150 
Venezuela B- Caa1 859  1143  1474  849  150 
          
 















3.2   Colombia’s Credit Rating 
 
Colombia is currently rated BB with a stable outlook by Standard & Poor’s and with a 
negative outlook by Moody’s,
40 the two main rating agencies.  The rating systems and 
terminologies used by the two agencies are summarised in the appendix. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Credit rating history of Colombia (long-term foreign currency ratings) 
 
Standard & Poor’s 
 
Moody’s 
22 Jun 1993   BBB-/Stable     
21 Sep 1994   BBB-/Positive     
    25 May 1995  Ba1/Positive 
    19 Sep 1995  Baa3/Stable 
7 Oct 1997   BBB-/Stable     
    30 Sep 1998  Baa3/Negative 
11 Jun 1999   BBB-/Negatve     
    11 Aug 1999  Ba2/Stable 
21 Sep 1999   BB+/Stable     
10 Apr 2000   BB+/Negative     
23 May 2000   BB/Negative     
    27 Mar 2002  Ba2/Negative 
14 Jul 2003  BB/Stable     
      
 
Source: Standard & Poor’s, and Moody’s 
 
 
The credit-rating history of Colombia is presented in Table 3.2.  The last time Colombia 
was upgraded, was in September 1995, when Moody’s increased its rating from Ba1 to 
Baa3.  The agency motivated its decision in the following way: 
                                                 
40 Colombia is rated Ba2 by Moody’s, which corresponds to the BB rating by Standard & Poor’s.  We will 
in this paper use the terminology of Standard & Poor’s unless we specifically refer to Moody’s.   33
 
The Colombian economy has grown strongly in 1993 and 1994.  Moody’s expects 
that this growth pattern will continue during the next two years.  In 1995, we 
expect GDP growth to exceed 5% for the third year in a row.  At the same time, 
fiscal performance has remained strong.  Exports have also expanded in 1994, and 
are set to rise at a rapid pace as the Cusiana and Cupiagua oil fields come on 
stream.  Colombia may triple its oil exports by the end of the century.  As a result, 
Colombia’s debt/GDP and debt/exports ratios have fallen considerably.  Finally, 
Colombia was nearly unaffected by the crisis of confidence that followed the 




Colombia has since then, together with a number of other emerging market economies, 
seen its credit rating downgraded.  In August 1999, Colombia was downgraded by 
Moody’s by two notches from Baa3 to Ba2.  Standard & Poor’s followed by a one-notch 
downgrade from BBB- to BB+ in September 1999.  These downgrades were particularly 
serious, since they implied a downgrade from investment-grade to speculative-grade 
ratings.  A consequence of this is that portfolio managers who are restricted to holding 
investment-grade securities, would not be able to invest in Colombian sovereign bonds. 
 
Moody’s said that the rating decision reflects the country’s weaker economic 
fundamentals indicated by a deterioration in both the external and fiscal accounts.  
A direct result of major macroeconomic imbalances, Colombia’s external 
indebtedness has increased at a rapid pace since the mid-1990s.  Consequently, 
the debt-servicing burden has also gotten heavier.
42 
 
The agency continues: 
 
Despite all the difficulties presently facing the country, a major strength remains 
Colombia’s long track record of sound financial and economic management.   
Although there has been a deterioration in a number of traditional ratios used to 
measure creditworthiness, the overall accumulated debt burden remains below 
that of other more highly indebted Latin American countries.
43 
                                                 
41 Moody’s (1995b). 
42 Moody’s (1999). 
43 Moody’s (1999).   34
Standard & Poor’s added in their motivation: 
 
The downgrade reflects the Colombian government’s weakened capacity to 
implement effective economic policies, given the debilitating impact of the 
conflict with the country’s insurgency groups.  The protracted conflict, in turn, 
has exacerbated this year’s recession, reduced the country’s medium-term growth 
prospects, and weakened the domestic banking system.
44 
 
In May 2000, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Colombia a further notch to its current BB 
rating.  The agency wrote: 
 
The downgrade reflects the expectation that the government’s fiscal adjustment 
will fall short, due to deteriorated relations with Congress and poorer growth 
prospects stemming from continued guerrilla violence.  … The Pastrana 
Administration, in an effort to reduce corruption and reform the state, has strained 
relations with Congress by threatening to hold a referendum for its dissolution.  
Without a robust fiscal adjustment  and better growth, Colombia’s gross public-




Colombia is currently rated BB by both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s.  Standard & 
Poor’s, nevertheless, changed its outlook from negative to stable in July 2003, referring 
to improved fiscal performance, higher growth prospects and an improvement in the 
security situation.
46 
                                                 
44 Standard & Poor’s (1999). 
45 Standard & Poor’s (2000). 
46 See Standard & Poor’s (2002b, 2003)   35
 
Standard & Poor’s expects passage of the economic measures in the fall 2003 
national referendum, given the overwhelming popular support that President 
Alvaro Uribe commands… The freeze in spending and pension measures included 
in the referendum are crucial to further fiscal consolidation, which is needed to 
stabilize the government’s adverse debt dynamics.  With these measures, the 
general government deficit is expected to decline to 3.6% of GDP in 2003 from 
5.2% in 2002, and the general government debt to stabilize at 53% of GDP… 
Additionally, after five years of lacklustre growth averaging just 0.4%, the 
country’s economic growth prospects have improved.  Growth is now projected at 
2.5% in 2003 and over 3.0% in 2004.  Improved growth prospects largely reflect 




Moody’s has, nevertheless, decided to keep the negative outlook for the time being. 
 
The negative outlook incorporates concerns about the ability of the Uribe 
administration to reverse recent trends that have contributed to a continued 
deterioration in the fiscal accounts… The outlook also reflects the major 
challenges that the current administration will face in order to stabilize public debt 
ratios in an environment that is likely to be characterized by weak GDP growth.  
Additional complications include the financial demands that will be placed on the 
budget as a result of the anticipated increase in defence-related spending.  Export 
prospects for traditional products will continue to be affected by low commodity 
prices and domestic supply problems.  Nontraditional exports will be negatively 
affected by the deterioration of economic conditions in the Andean region and 
modest growth prospects in the US.
48 
 
                                                 
47 Standard & Poor’s (2003). 
48 Moody’s (2003).   36
Moody’s, furthermore, motivate their current Ba2 rating: 
 
Colombia’s Ba2 foreign-currency country ceiling reflects a high external debt 
burden evidenced by a debt-to-exports ratio of 220%, with external debt service 
absorbing 45% of current account receipts.  The rating is constrained by weak 
overall export performance.  The upward trend observed in the public debt-to-
GDP ratio and the presence of economic conditions that have led to sub-par 
growth in recent years are additional elements that constrain Colombia’s rating.  
The rating is supported by the presence of a stable macroeconomic environment 
characterized by low single-digit inflation, declining interest rates, and a 
manageable current account deficit.  Additional support for the rating is derived 
from the government’s dedicated effort to improve the debt profile.
49 
 
Other BB-rated countries include Bulgaria, Morocco, Panama, Philippines and Russia.  
All these countries have, however, traded at tighter spreads than Colombia, as illustrated 
in figure 3.7.  Even Peru, which is rated BB- by both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, 
has been trading at a tighter spread, even if this is not the case right now.  This supports 
the negative outlook that Moody’s and, until recently, also Standard & Poor’s had 
assigned to Colombian sovereign debt.  It also reflects the fact that Colombia, together 
with Peru, was severely affected by the uncertainties surrounding the Brazilian election in 
the second half of 2002.  As seen in table 3.3, none of the countries saw their spread 
rising to more than 615 basis points, apart from Colombia and Peru, who saw their 
spreads increasing to 1,076 and 893 basis points respectively.  Panama, the only other 
Latin American country in the sample, only saw its spread rising to 561 basis points. 
                                                 
49 Moody’s (2003).  See also Moody’s (2002).   37
Figure 3.7: Sovereign spread of selected BB-rated economies, average between Aug 
2002 and Jul 2003 (basis points) 
 
 









S&P       Moody’s
Spread 
26/7/03 
Spread during past 12 months 
Mean         Max.        Min.    Std. Dev. 
Colombia  BB  Ba2  431  674 1076 411  182 
          
Bulgaria  BB+  Ba2  227 282 415 220  54 
Egypt  BB+  Ba1  148 318 514 148  92 
Morocco  BB Ba1  249 390 568 225 103 
Panama  BB Ba1  350 431 561 340  62 
Peru  BB- Ba3  435 599 893 370 150 
Philippines BB Ba1  395 484 565 386  38 
Russia  BB Ba2  276 426 615 263 106 
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3.3   Potential Determinants of the Spread 
 
The sovereign spread is determined by a large number of factors.  Factors that directly 
influence the spread is a country’s creditworthiness and general emerging market 
sentiment.  The latter refers to the general risk averseness of international investors and 
their willingness to take on risk at a certain point in time.  Investors might, indeed, 
demand a different spread at different points in time to take on the same risk.  In this way, 
the same issue might trade at different spreads at different points in time, even if the 
creditworthiness of the issuer remains the same.  Another factor that plays an important 
part in pricing of emerging market sovereign bond issues is contagion.  Investors have a 
tendency to group issuers with similar characteristics together, so that an increase in the 
spread of one such issuer translates into a spread increase of the others.  Contagion will 
be dealt with in detail in the next chapter. 
 
Since the creditworthiness of a country is crucial when pricing its bonds, the determinants 
of the creditworthiness should also determine the spread.  In their statements on rating 
criteria, the main rating agencies list numerous economic, political and social factors that 
underlie their sovereign credit ratings.
50 Most of these factors are, however, not 
quantifiable,
51 and we will, therefore, limit this study to those economic factors that are 
quantifiable and regularly published, which is in line with most earlier studies. 
 
Rowland and Torres (2004) identifies a number of fundamental economic variables that 
can be envisaged to influence the sovereign creditworthiness and the sovereign spread.  
In line with some other earlier studies they divide these variables into solvency variables, 
liquidity variables, variables representing external shocks and dummy variables. 
 
The solvency variables relate to the country’s long-term ability to pay its debt.  The term 
solvency variable might be slightly misleading, since insolvency of a sovereign issuer is 
                                                 
50 See Standard & Poor’s (2002a), Moody’s (1991, 1995a), and Fitch (2002a). 
51 Cantor and Packer (1996), p. 39.   39
not a well-defined concept.  We have, nevertheless, in line with many other studies 
decided to use this term, since it is intuitive.  Variables belonging to this group include a 
country’s real growth rate, fiscal and current account balances, as well as its stock of 
external debt. 
 
The liquidity variables relates to the country’s short-term ability to pay its debt.  Even if a 
country has the long-term capability to service its debt, it may lack the necessary funds to 
service its debt at a specific point in time.  The foreign-currency debt has to be serviced 
out of the international reserves, so the debt service and the international reserves are the 
two most crucial variables in this category.  Exports is another important variable, since 
exports normally accounts for a significant part of foreign exchange earnings, and since 
exports in this sense is a much more stable source of foreign exchange than, for example, 
foreign investment flows, which can vary widely from year to year.  The debt service is, 
furthermore, directly dependent on the composition of the debt.  A large fraction of short-
term debt will increase the current debt service when this debt is maturing. 
 
The variables representing external shocks relates to those that capture external shocks to 
the economy.  The important role played by international interest rates in determining 




Theoretical models of creditworthiness or spread determination often include regional or 
country specific dummy variables, which take the value one if a certain condition is 
fulfilled and the value zero otherwise.  This set of variables does, however, only make 
sense in cross-country studies, and we will therefore not use them here. 
 
Table 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 lists the potential determinants of the spread identified by Rowland 
and Torres (2004), with some additions made for this particular study.
53 
                                                 
52 See, for example, Arora and Cerisola (2001), Barr and Pesaran (1997), Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart 
(1993), and Dooley, Fernandez-Arias and Kletzer (1996). 
53 Variables added include Growth of industrial production, together with all variables representing external 
shocks (table 3.6) apart from the US T-Bill rate, which was included in Rowland and Torres (2004).   40
Table 3.4.  Potential determinants of the sovereign spread: Solvency variables 
 
Variable 
(unit of measure) 
Rationale Data   
Frequency 
Real GDP Growth (%)  A high growth rate normally generates a stronger 
fiscal position.  A high growth rate, therefore, 
suggests that the country’s debt burden will 
become easier to service over time. 
 
Quarterly 
Growth of industrial 
production (%) 
 
This can be used as a proxy for GDP growth with 
the advantage that it is less seasonal and that it is 





A large fiscal deficit (i.e. a large negative fiscal 
balance) indicates that the government lacks the 
ability or the will to increase taxes to cover current 
expenses including its debt service.  A weak fiscal 
position also implies a higher likelihood that 





A large current account deficit indicates that the 
economy relies heavily on funds from abroad.   
Persistent current account deficits generates a 
growth in foreign indebtedness, which may 
become unsustainable in the long term. 
 
Quarterly 
External debt/GDP (%)  The higher the debt burden, the larger the transfer 
effort the country will need to make over time to 
service its obligations.  A higher debt burden, 
therefore, corresponds to a higher risk of default.  
This measure does, however, not say that much 
about the annual debt service burden imposed on 
the country, which also depends on the maturity 
structure as well as on the yield of the debt. 
 
Quarterly 
CPI Inflation (%)  A high rate of inflation is indicative of structural 
problems in the government’s finances.  Many 
governments have resorted to inflationary finance 
of the fiscal deficit when they have been unable or 
unwilling to raise taxes or to cut spendings to 
bring down the deficit.  The rate of inflation can, 
therefore, be used as a measure of government 
discipline.  Public dissatisfaction with a high 
inflation rate might, furthermore, generate political 
instability. 
Monthly 
     
 
Source: Rowland and Torres (2004), with the exception of Growth of industrial production that has been 
added. 
   41
Table 3.5.  Potential determinants of the sovereign spread: Liquidity variables 
 
Variable 
(unit of measure) 
Rationale Data   
Frequency 
Reserves/GDP (%)  The foreign debt has to be serviced out of the 
international reserves.  For this reason, low reserve 
levels sharply increases the risk of default. 
 
Monthly 
Debt service/GDP (%)  The debt service is dependent on the level of the 
debt, but also on its composition and yield.  A high 
debt-service burden indicates that the country 
might face problems in servicing its obligations.   
Large amortizations might be difficult to roll over, 
particularly in times when international risk 




Exports/GDP (%)  Exports is a major source of foreign exchange, and 
countries with large exports are normally less 
vulnerable to external shocks when it comes to 





If a country has a large proportion of short-term 
debt that has to be rolled over, this might generate 




Maturity of external 
debt (yrs) 
This is another measure of the composition of the 
debt.  A short time to maturity implies a large 




Source: Rowland and Torres (2004). 
 
Note: Rowland and Torres (2004) also include the debt-service-to-reserves ratio and debt-service-to-exports 
ratio.  These are only published with annual frequency and are, therefore, omitted here. 
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(unit of measure) 




If the exchange rate is depreciating, the debt 
burden measured as the debt-to-GDP ratio will 
increase, and so will the debt-service ratios.  The 
debt will, therefore, be more difficult to service 
and the default risk will increase. 
 
Daily 
3-month US T-Bill rate 
(%) 
The interest rate yielded by the 3-month US 
Treasury Bill is a liquid US dollar interest rate, and 
we, therefore, regard it as good proxy for global 
liquidity conditions.  Some other studies have used 
the London Inter-Bank Offering Rate (LIBOR), 
but these two rates should be closely correlated, so 
the choice between the two are of less importance. 
 
Daily 
S&P 500 stock market 
index 
A weak stock market might lead investors to look 
for alternative sources of high return.  On the other 
hand, a fall in the stock market might also lead to a 
flight to quality.  These two effects have the 
opposite impact on emerging market bonds, and in 
general, the latter has been the dominant. 
 
Daily 
EMBI Global Mexico  Mexico was the first country to issue Brady bonds, 
and it has also the largest weight in the different 
EMBI composites.  For this reason, the Mexican 
issues are normally used as benchmarks when 
pricing other emerging market debt, and it might, 




EMBI Global  The EMBI Global spread composite for emerging 
markets world wide can be used as a measure of 
general market sentiment.  It might also have a 





Source: Rowland and Torres (2004) together with own intuition. 
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Figure 3.8 to 3.11 graphs some of the variables for Colombia, Brazil, Mexico and 
Argentina for the period 1999 to 2002.  Note that Colombia, Brazil and Mexico are rated 
BB, B+, and BBB-, and that Argentina was rated BBB- 1999 and 2000 and BB up until 
March 2001.  Argentina defaulted in December 2001. 
 
As illustrated by figure 3.8, Colombia had a lower average GDP growth rate than both 
Mexico and Brazil for the period.  Argentina, on the other hand, had by far the worst 
GDP development of the four countries. 
 
Figure 3.9 illustrates the debt-to-GDP ratio of the four countries.  It is apparent that 
Colombia and Brazil has similar levels of debt to GDP, while Mexico has a significantly 
lower level.  Argentina’s debt-to-GDP level was initially held down by an overvalued 
exchange rate, but increased dramatically when the exchange rate was floated in early 
2002. 
 
The Colombian international reserves are standing at a very healthy level, as shown by 
figure 3.10.  At around 12 percent, Colombia has the highest reserves-to-GDP ratio of the 
four countries. 
 
Colombia is, on the other hand, running a high fiscal deficit.  Even if the fiscal deficit as a 
percentage of GDP is standing at the same level as in Brazil, it is significantly higher than 
in both Mexico and Argentina.  Even if the Argentine fiscal deficit was significantly 
reduced in 2002 by the fact that Argentina did not service its debt, it was, indeed, 
considerably lower than the Colombian deficit for the preceding years as well.   
   44
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Figure 3.11: Fiscal deficit to GDP (%) 
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4  Contagion and the Colombian Spread 
 
One potential determinant of the Colombian spread is the spread of bonds of other similar 
sovereign issuers.  As we saw in figure 3.1 in the previous chapter, the Colombian spread 
reached 1,000 basis points twice between early 1997 and mid-2003.  In both these 
occasions, the surge in the spread was due to foreign events that influenced the 
Colombian spread.  In the first occasion it was because of the Russian crisis, and in the 
second occasion because of the Brazilian election and the perceived risk of a Brazilian 
default.  These events quickly affected the Colombian spread through contagion.  The 
influence of contagion on the Colombian spread will be examined in this chapter, which 
starts by defining and discussing the concept of contagion in section 4.1.  Section 4.2 
analyses the influence of contagion and spillovers on the Colombian spread, and section 
4.3 studies how this has changed over time. 
 
 
4.1   Contagion 
 
Contagion is a relatively new concept in economics.
54 Before the 1990s only limited 
research had been done in the area.  However, interest in contagion surged during the 
second half of the 1990s, when financial crises spread across emerging markets, affecting 
countries with apparently healthy fundamentals and whose policies only a few months 
earlier had been praised by market analysts and multilateral institutions alike.
55 Since 
then, an extensive literature on the subject has emerged.
56 
 
The international propagation of financial shocks is not a new phenomenon.  “What is 
new, or at least surprising, is that shocks originating is a particular country affect, in a 
very severe and unexpected way, nations that are very distant and that appear to be 
largely unrelated to the shock originator.”
57 Examples of this type of situations include 
                                                 
54 See, for instance, Edwards (2000) for a discussion. 
55 See, for example, Masson (1998).   
56 See, for instance, Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000), for a review of this literature. 
57 Edwards (2000), pp. 874f.   47
the transmission of the Asian crisis of 1997, which started in Thailand and propagated 
throughout emerging markets, and the Russian crises of 1998, which sent Latin American 
sovereign spreads skyrocketing.   
 
Contagion has in the literature been defined in a number of different ways.  A broad 
definition is that contagion is any transmission of shocks across countries.  A more 
restricted definition, and maybe a more useful one, is that contagion is an international 
transmission of shocks that exceeds what was originally expected.  Edwards (2000) 
discusses some different definitions of contagion: 
 
In order to formalise this definition we can distinguish between three mechanisms 
through which economic shocks are propagated across countries.  The first one 
corresponds to global disturbances that affect all (or most) countries in the world.  
The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 are good examples of these aggregate disturbances, 
which Masson (1998) has called international monsoons.  The second  mechanism 
corresponds to shocks coming from a related country.  Some authors have referred to 
this phenomenon as spillovers (Masson (1998)) or as fundamentals-based contagion 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)).  This would be the case, for example, when a crisis 
in a trade partner reduces greatly the demand for our exports.  … This channel does 
not appear to be particularly important in the case of emerging economies.  The third 
mechanism includes all instances not covered by the two previous cases, and 
corresponds to our definition of contagion.  That is, contagion is defined as a residual, 
and thus as a situation where the extent and magnitude of the international 
transmission of shocks exceeds what was expected by market participants.
58 
 
Contagion and other spill-over effects can explain a significant part of sovereign spreads, 
and in this sense they are complimentary to fundamentals in identifying the determinants 
of spreads.  We will in the next two sections look at how the sovereign spreads of other 
markets have influenced Colombian sovereign spreads. 
 
                                                 
58 Edwards (2000), pp. 879f.   48
 
4.2   The Colombian Spread, Contagion and Spillovers 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the correlation between the Colombian daily spread and the global 
emerging market composite as well as the Latin American composite for the past two 12-
month periods.  It is apparent that for the past 12 months (mid-2002 to mid-2003), 
Colombian spreads experienced a very high correlation with both global emerging 
markets and with Latin American markets.  The correlation coefficient was as high as 
0.94 between Colombia and global emerging markets and 0.93 between Colombia and 
Latin American markets.  The correlations with European emerging markets and with 
Asian emerging markets were lower,
59 with correlation coefficients standing at 0.90 and 
0.42 respectively. 
 
Another interesting observation from figure 4.1 is that correlation has changed 
significantly over time.  During the period mid-2001 to mid-2002 the correlation was 
much lower.  This period did indeed include the Argentine default, which had a 
significant impact on both the global emerging market spread composite and on the Latin 
American spread composite, since Argentina was an important country in those 
aggregates.  The Argentine default did, however, only have a very limited effect on the 
Colombian spread as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
If we study the daily spread correlation between Colombia and some other Latin 
American countries, the pattern looks very similar, as illustrated by figure 4.2.  The 
Colombian spread experienced a high correlation with both the Mexican and the 
Brazilian spread during the past 12 months (mid-2002 to mid-2003).  The correlation 
coefficients between the Colombian daily spread and that of Mexico and Brazil were 0.96 
and 0.92 respectively.  Colombia even showed a relatively high correlation with the 
Argentine spread, with a correlation coefficient of 0.66, even if Argentina was in 
structural default throughout the period.  Venezuela is the only country of the four in the 
figure whose spread was de-coupled from the Colombian spread. 
                                                 
59 This has not been graphed here.   49
Figure 4.1.  Emerging market daily spread correlation with Colombia 
 
 




Figure 4.2.  Daily spread correlation with Colombia of selected countries 
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During the previous 12-month period (mid-2001 to mid-2002) the pattern again is similar 
to that of figure 4.1.  The correlations between the Colombian spread and those of 
Mexico and Brazil are much lower than during the proceeding 12 months (mid-2002 to 
mid-2003).  Again Venezuela seems de-coupled from Colombia, and so does Argentina.  
Note that Argentina defaulted in the end of 2001, and as discussed in the previous 
chapter, this had very limited effect on Colombian spreads. 
 
 
4.3   Changes in Cross-Country Spread Correlation over Time 
 
The figures in the previous section (figure 4.1 and 4.2) showed that the correlation 
between the daily Colombian spread and that of a number of other Latin American 
countries as well as of emerging markets in general was very high during the past 12 
months (mid-2002 to mid-2003).  The figures also suggested that this correlation has 
changed considerably over time. 
 
We will in this section study how the cross-country spread correlation has changed over 
time.  For this purpose we compute the rolling 60-day correlation coefficient between the 
Colombian spread and that of some selected countries. 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the 60-day rolling correlation between the Colombian spread and that of 
the global emerging market composite as defined by the JP Morgan EMBI Global.  The 
figure shows that there has indeed been significant correlation for large time periods.  In 
fact, the correlation coefficient exceeded 0.70 for 55 percent of the time period studied.  
This suggests that spillovers and contagion plays an important part in determining the 
Colombian spread.   51
Figure 4.3.  Changes in global emerging market spread correlation with Colombia 
(60-day rolling correlations) 
 
 




Figure 4.4.  Changes in spread correlation between Colombia and Argentina 
(60-day rolling correlations) 
 
 

















































































































































































We continue by studying the 60-day rolling correlation between the Colombian spread 
and that of three other Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.  Figure 
4.4 shows the correlation between the Colombian and Argentine spread.  It is apparent 
that while there was significant correlation up until early 2001, the relationship between 
the Colombian and Argentine spread broke down thereafter.  This is in line with the 
conclusion of the previous chapter that Argentina de-coupled from the rest of the 
emerging markets during its crisis. 
 
Figure 4.5 and 4.6 show the rolling correlation between the Colombian spread and those 
of Brazil and Mexico respectively.  An interesting observation is that the correlation 
seems to have broken down around March 2001, which might be explained by the crisis 
between President Pastrana and the Congress leading to a surge in the Colombian spread 
at that time.  This dip in correlation is also visible in figures 4.3 and 4.4.  A further 
observation from figures 4.5 and 4.6 is the apparent breakdown in correlation during 
2001, which might be related to a general de-coupling of emerging markets initiated by 
the Argentine crisis.  After mid-2002 correlation has once again increased to high level, 
and this particularly between the spreads of Colombia and Mexico, as illustrated in figure 
4.6.  In general, Colombian spreads seem to be more influenced by Mexican spreads than 
by Brazilian spreads, even if the correlation with the latter is considerable.  The 
correlation coefficient between Colombian and Mexican spreads exceeded 0.70 during 61 
percent of the time period studied, while between Colombia and Brazil this figure was 
only slightly lower at 59 percent. 
 
We can, consequently, conclude that contagion and spillovers from other emerging 
markets play a very important role in determining the Colombian spread.   53
Figure 4.5.  Changes in spread correlation between Colombia and Brazil 
(60-day rolling correlations) 
 
 




Figure 4.6.  Changes in spread correlation between Colombia and Mexico 
(60-day rolling correlations) 
 
 

















































































































































































5  Short-Term Determinants of the Spread 
 
We concluded in the previous chapter that contagion and spillovers from other emerging 
markets played an important role in determining the Colombian sovereign spread.  In this 
chapter we will study the short-term determinants of the spread, including spillovers.  We 
start by discussing the potential determinants in section 5.1.  Section 5.2 defines the data 
set that will be used in the empirical study, and section 5.3 continues by presenting the 
regressions and discussing the results of the study. 
 
 
5.1   Potential Determinants of Daily Spread Changes 
 
Some emerging market fixed income traders have suggested to me that the emerging 
market country spreads are to a large extent determined by news and events coming out 
of the country.  However, during periods when no such news are emerging, the spreads 
are almost exclusively determined by the spread of emerging markets in general as well 
as by the US stock market. 
 
It is possible to envisage two ways in which the US stock market could influence 
emerging market spreads.  First, a weak stock market might lead investors to look for 
alternative sources of high return, and in such a case, high-yield bonds, both US corporate 
high-yield issues and emerging market issues, could provide an attractive alternative.  A 
falling stock market should, consequently, lead to an increase in emerging market bond 
prices and, thus, a fall in the spread.  Second, a falling stock market might lead to a flight 
to quality, where investors look for low-risk alternatives until the stock market has 
stabilised.  This would lead investors to sell emerging market debt and to invest in 
higher-grade alternatives.  A falling stock market would, in this case, lead to a fall in 
emerging market bond prices and, thus, a rise in the spread.  The two effects, accordingly, 
have the opposite impact on emerging market bonds, and in general, the latter has been 
the dominant. 
   55
Another factor that could influence emerging market bond spreads in the short term is the 
international interest rate, which is a good proxy for global liquidity conditions.  The 
international interest rate has, indeed, turned out as a significant determinant of the spread 
in some earlier studies.
60 We have here decided to use the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate 
as a measure of the interest rate.  Some other studies have used the London Inter-Bank 
Offering Rate (LIBOR), but these two should be closely correlated, so the choice between 
the two is of less importance. 
 
To investigate the influence of spillovers and contagion on the Colombian spread, we 
have, furthermore, chosen to use two measures of emerging market spreads: The EMBI 
Global emerging market composite and the EMBI Global Mexico composite.  The former 
is a natural choice since it includes all emerging markets and, therefore, should be a good 
measure of general emerging market sentiment.  The latter has been chosen since 
Mexican issues are normally used as benchmarks when pricing other emerging market 
debt.  Mexico was the first country to issue Brady bonds, and it has the largest weight in 
the different EMBI composites, and for this reason it is generally used as a benchmark.  
The Mexican spread might, furthermore, have a larger influence on the Colombian spread 
since it is a Latin American country and, therefore, has more similarities with Colombia 
than, for example, the Asian economies included in the EMBI Global emerging market 
composite. 
 
The variables discussed above were, moreover, identified in chapter 3 as potential 
determinants of the Colombian spread, and of the variables identified in chapter 3, these 
were, furthermore, the only ones that exist with daily frequency. 
 
In addition we have decided to include the USD/COP exchange rate as a potential 
explanatory variable.  An exchange rate depreciation leads to worsening debt-to-GDP and 
debt-service-to-GDP ratios, which might generate long-term problems in servicing the 
debt.  The depreciation of the Argentine peso during 2002, for example, lead to a 
deterioration of the Argentine debt-to-GDP ratio from 52.0 percent in the beginning of 
                                                 
60 See, for example, Nogués and Grandes (2001), and Ades, Kaune, Leme, Masih and Tenengauzer (2000).   56
the year to an unsustainable 148.5 percent in the end of the year.  Nevertheless, care has 
to be taken when analysing the exchange rate, since it is a potentially endogenous 
variable.  A change in the Colombian spread might very well lead to an exchange rate 
adjustment.  The variables explaining the spread might, furthermore, also have a strong 
influence upon exchange rate. 
 
Finally, we have decided to study the daily spread changes rather than the levels of the 




5.2   The Dataset 
 
For the empirical analysis we use daily data from 1 January 1998 to 15 May 2003.  As 
discussed earlier we use the EMBI Global Colombia spread composite as a measure of 
the Colombian sovereign spread.  As potential explanatory variables we use the S&P 500 
stock market index,
61 the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate, the EMBI Global Mexico 
composite and the EMBI Global emerging market composite.
62 
 
Table 5.1 presents the unit-root tests for the different variables, and it is apparent from the 
table that all the variables can be assumed to be integrated of order one, I(1).  Note also 
that we are using the logarithmic values of the exchange rate and the S&P 500, since both 
these series are exponential.  Since all variables are I(1) we decided to use the first 
differentials of the variables in the regression.  Since these are stationary, we can use a 
standard OLS regression technique.
63 
                                                 
61 The S&P 500 is generally regarded as the best US stock market index.  It is a weighted average of the 
share prices of the 500 largest US companies.  Another widely cited index is the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average.  This does, however, only include 30 large traditional US companies, not necessarily the largest, 
and it is a non-weighted average. 
62 Data sources are JP Morgan for the EMBI Global composites and Datastream for the S&P 500 and the 
US T-Bill rate. 
63 By testing the time series for cointegration, we can conclude that these are not cointegrated.  In the next 
chapter we will, nevertheless, develop a cointegration model, using another dataset.   57
Table 5.1.  Unit root tests for the time series 




Level First  Difference 
   
EMBIG Colombia  ADF(1) = -2.71  ADF(0) = -33.40 
EMBIG emerging markets  ADF(10) = -2.62  ADF(9) = -9.69 
EMBIG Mexico  ADF(10) = -1.75  ADF(9) = -11.67 
S&P 500 (logged)  ADF(0) = -1.46  ADF(0) = -38.00 
3-month T-Bill rate  ADF(1) = 0.23  ADF(0) = -34.05 
Exchange rate (logged)  ADF(0) = -1.36  ADF(0) = -35.15 
   
 
Note: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to test for unit roots.  The value in parentheses is the order 
of the lag used, which is decided by using the Schwartz information criteria.  The null hypothesis in each 
case is that the variable is integrated of order one and, thereby, non-stationary.  The 5 percent rejection 
region for non-stationarity for the Dickey-Fuller statistic is ADF < -2.89.  Note furthermore that EMBIG 




5.3   Estimation and Results 
 
We use an OLS regression technique to identify the significant explanatory variables and 
their parameter estimates.  As discussed in the previous section, we use daily time series 
data from 1 January 1998 to 15 May 2003.  Spread data is only collected on trading days 
(i.e. not on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays), which gives us a total of 1,402 
observations.  We, furthermore, use the first differentials of the data, which are 
stationary, and this allows us to use OLS estimation.  A standard model of the spread is a 









, β         (4.1) 
 
where t = 1, 2, … , T are the number of observations, Xk,t are the time series of the 
different explanatory variables, βk their parameter estimates, and et is an error term. 
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The regression results are presented in table 5.2.  It is apparent that the 3-month Treasury 
Bill rate in the first regression is not a significant determinant of the Colombian spread.  
We, therefore, decided to omit this variable, and rerun the regression.  In the third 
regression the USD/COP exchange rate has been added as an explanatory variable, and it 
is, indeed, significant.  This regression also produces a better adjusted R-squared value.  
In the fourth regression the EMBI Global emerging market composite has been replaced 
by the EMBI Global Mexican composite.  This produces a marginally better result with a 
slight increase in the adjusted R-squared value. 
 
We can, consequently, conclude that in the short term, global emerging market spreads 
(or the Mexican spread), the S&P 500 stock market index and the USD/COP exchange 
rate are all significant determinants of the Colombian spread.  A stock market fall, 
furthermore, leads to a rise in the Colombian spread, indicating that a falling stock market 
induces a flight to higher-grade bonds, as discussed previously.  An exchange rate 
depreciation also leads to a rise in the spread, as predicted.  However, care has to be taken 
when interpreting this result since the causality between the exchange rate and the 
sovereign spread is not clear.  A rising spread might, indeed, induce a depreciation of the 
exchange rate.  In addition, the same variables might be determinants of the spread and 
the exchange rate, as discussed earlier. 
   59





Dependent Variable: EMBIG Colombia 
EMBIG emerging markets  0.4046  0.4062  0.4064  – 
  (20.48) (20.61) (20.97)   
      
EMBIG  Mexico  – – –  0.4919 
      (22.03) 
      
3-month T-Bill rate  -7.749  –  –  – 
  (-1.04)     
      
S&P  500  (logged)  -166.8 -168.9 -162.0 -166.9 
  (-5.42) (-5.50) (-5.36) (-5.62) 
      
Exchange rate (logged)  –  –  493.0  464.9 
     (6.94)  (6.62) 
      
No  of  observations  1402 1402 1402 1402 
Adjusted R
2  0.293 0.293 0.316 0.333 
Standard  error  14.70 14.70 14.46 14.28 
Durbin-Watson  1.91 1.91 1.96 1.95 
      
 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses.  All parameter estimates are significant at the 5 percent level with the 
exception of the T-Bill rate.  EMBIG stands for the EMBI Global spread composite.  A constant is included 
but not reported. 
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6  Long-Term Determinants Within a Johansen Framework 
 
In this chapter we are using the Johansen framework of multivariate cointegration to 
investigate the long-term determinants of the Colombian spread.  Section 6.1 identifies a 
number of potential determinants.  The data set is defined and discussed in section 6.2, 
and likelihood estimation and results are presented in section 6.3. 
 
 
6.1   Potential Long-Term Determinants 
 
In chapter 3 we discussed a number of potential determinants of the sovereign spread.  
Since we are using time-series data for a relatively short period of time, we need to use 
data with a monthly frequency.  Of the potential determinants discussed in chapter 3, the 
following exists with monthly frequency: 
 
•  Growth of industrial production 
•  Fiscal balance 
•  CPI inflation 
•  Foreign reserves 
•  Exports 
•  Exchange rate 
•  3-month US T-Bill rate 
•  S&P 500 stock market index 
•  EMBI Global Mexico spread composite 
•  EMBI Global emerging market spread composite 
 
Note that some of these variables were in chapter 3 expressed as a GDP ratio, for 
example fiscal balance to GDP.  Since we are only studying one country, Colombia, and 
since we are not interested in comparing the variables with other countries, this is not 
necessary here.   61
 
6.2   The Dataset 
 
For the analysis we will here use five years of monthly data, from January 1998 to 
December 2002.  As before, we will use the JP Morgan EMBI Global Colombia spread 
composite to represent the Colombian spread.  We use the set of variables identified in 
the previous section as potential explanatory variables with a few adjustments.  We will 
use industrial production as well as both monthly and annual growth of industrial 
production as potential explanatory variables.  We will furthermore use the consumer 
price index as a potential explanatory variable, since the definition of the inflation rate for 
monthly data is problematic.  Month-on-month inflation is, even if seasonally adjusted, 
very unstable and does, therefore, not make much sense in this study.  Year-on-year 
inflation, on the other hand, has inherent problems; a one-off price shock will, for 
example, translate into a higher inflation rate not just only for that month but also for the 
11 following months.  In addition to the USD/COP exchange rate, we are also using the 
real effective exchange rate index as a potential explanatory variable in line with some 
previous studies.
64 Table 6.1 defines the variables together with their data sources.   
 
                                                 
64 See, for example, Budina and Manchew (2000), and Ades, Kaune, Leme, Masih and Tenengauzer 
(2000).   62




Definition and unit of measurement  Data source 
    
SPREADCO  EMBI Global Colombia (bp)  JP Morgan 
PROD  Industrial production index  IFS 
GROWTHY  Annual industrial production growth (%)  Calc from production 
GROWTHM  Monthly industrial production growth (%)  Calc from production 
FBAL  Fiscal balance (constant COP)  IFS 
CPI  Consumer price index (logged)  IFS 
RES  Gross foreign reserves (USD) (logged)  IFS 
EXP  Exports (USD) (logged)  IFS 
FX  USD/COP exchange rate (logged)  IFS 
REER  Real effective exchange rate (logged)  IFS 
TBILL  3-month US T-Bill rate  IFS 
SP500  S&P 500 stock market index (logged)  Datastream 
SPREADMX  EMBI Global Mexico (bp)  JP Morgan 
SPREADEM  EMBI Global emerging markets (bp)  JP Morgan 
    
 
Note: IFS stands for International Financial Statistics produced by the International Monetary Fund.  The 
USD/COP exchange rate is the end-of-period rate.  Monthly industrial production growth, fiscal balance, 
consumer price index, foreign reserves, and exports are all seasonally adjusted using an X11 method.  All 
the spreads are measured in basis points (bp). 
 
 
The unit-root tests for the different variables are presented in table 6.2.  We can conclude 
from the table that all the variables are integrated of order one, I(1), apart from industrial 
production, month-on-month growth of industrial production and the fiscal balance.  The 
Colombian spread is, however, a border case where the null-hypothesis that the variable 
is I(1) can be rejected at the 5 percent level but not at the 1 percent level.  We will, 
nevertheless, for the analysis in this chapter assume the Colombian spread to be I(1), 
which is a condition for using a cointegration framework for the study.   63
Table 6.2.  Unit root tests for the time series 




Level First  Difference 
   
SPREADCO  ADF(0) = -2.99  ADF(0) = -6.89 
PROD  ADF(9) = -3.79   
GROWTHY  ADF(1) = -1.60  ADF(0) = -11.53 
GROWTHM  ADF(1) = -8.67   
FBAL  ADF(0) = -8.72   
CPI  ADF(2) = -1.94  ADF(1) = -3.96 
RES  ADF(4) = -0.57  ADF(0) = -8.41 
EXP  ADF(4) = -1.16  ADF(3) = -6.41 
FX  ADF(0) = -0.89  ADF(0) = -6.02 
REER  ADF(1) = -1.36  ADF(0) = -4.81 
TBILL  ADF(1) = -0.08  ADF(0) = -4.91 
SP500  ADF(0) = -1.03  ADF(0) = -7.67 
SPREADMX  ADF(0) = -1.93  ADF(0) = -7.75 
SPREADEM  ADF(0) = -2.83  ADF(0) = -8.01 
   
 
Note: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to test for unit roots.  The value in parentheses is the order 
of the lag used, which is decided by using the Schwartz information criteria.  The null hypothesis in each 
case is that the variable is integrated of order one and, thereby, non-stationary.  The 5 percent rejection 
region for non-stationarity for the Dickey-Fuller statistic is ADF < -2.89, and the 1 percent rejection region 




6.3   Likelihood Estimation and Results 
 
The Johansen estimation test procedure used here, is a method for estimating the 
cointegrating relationships that exist between a set of variables as well as testing these 
relationships.  The framework was originally developed by Johansen (1988)
65 and has 
since then been widely used and documented.
66 
 
For variables to be cointegrated, they, by definition, all have to be integrated of the same 
order.  We can of this reason conclude that, of the variables identified in the previous 
                                                 
65 See also Johansen (1990, 1991, 1995).   64
section, industrial production, monthly production growth and the fiscal balance cannot 
be cointegrated with the rest of the variables, since these three variables are stationary 
and the rest are integrated of order one. 
 
Using the Johansen estimation procedure together with the non-stationary variables 
discussed in the previous section, we test a number of potential cointegrating 
relationships.  The maximum lag length is chosen using an information criteria, the levels 
and signs of the parameters of the cointegrating vector together with the performance of 
the model in terms of the normality assumption.  In this way we are able to identify three 
valid cointegrating relationships, 
 
(SPREADCO, EXP, FX, TBILL)        6.1 
 
(SPREADCO, EXP, REER, TBILL)       6.2 
 
(SPREADCO, GROWTHY, FX, TBILL)       6.3 
 
Likelihood ratio tests, furthermore, leads us to assume one cointegrating vector in all of 
the three relationships.  All the variables of the three systems are non-stationary, and 
none of them is excluded from the respective cointegrating vectors.  The results of the 
estimation procedure are presented in tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
66 See, for example, Enders (1995).   65
Table 6.3.  Estimation results for the first cointegrating relationship 
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Table 6.4.  Estimation results for the second cointegrating relationship 
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Table 6.5.  Estimation results for the third cointegrating relationship 
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The relationship states that, in the long term, the Colombian spread is related to the 
exports, the production growth rate, the exchange rate as well as to the US T-Bill rate.  
As expected, a fall in exports leads to a rise in the spread, and so does a fall in the 
production growth rate, a depreciation of the exchange rate, and an increase in the US T-
Bill rate. 
 
The results of this study, furthermore, suggest that neither the consumer price index, nor 
the foreign reserves or the S&P 500 stock market index have a long-term influence on the 
Colombian spread.  Moreover, neither the Mexican spread nor the global emerging 
market spread has a long-term relationship with the Colombian spread. 
   67
7  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have studied the determinants of the Colombian sovereign spread both in 
the short and long term.  We have concluded that contagion and spillovers plays an 
important part, particularly in the short term.  In addition we have identified a number of 
variables as significantly influencing the spread.  The empirical study of the short-term 
determinants of the spread used daily data in differential form in an OLS-regression 
framework.  For the study of the long-term determinants, we used a Johansen framework 
of multivariate cointegration together with monthly data.  The results of these empirical 
studies are summarised in table 7.1. 
 
 
Table 7.1: Results of the empirical studies 
 
 Short  term 
 
Long term 
    
Estimation technique:  OLS Johansen 
    
Data frequency:  Daily data (in differentials)  Monthly data 
    
Period studied:  1 Jan 1998 – 15 May 2003  Jan 1998 – Dec 2002 
    
Significant explanatory 
variables: 
•  Spread of other emerging 
markets 
•  US stock market 
•  Exchange rate 
•  Exports 
•  Exchange rate 
•  Economic growth rate 
•  US T-Bill rate 
    
 
   68
A weakness of this study is that it excludes potential determinants of the spread that are 
published only with annual frequency.  This is because the period studied is too short to 
include those variables.  All single-country studies will suffer from this weakness until 
longer time series of data are available.  Cross-country studies have, nevertheless, found a 
number of such variables to have a significant impact on the spread.  Rowland and Torres 
(2004) and Rowland (2004) are two cross-country studies that identifies the determinants 
of the spread, credit ratings and creditworthiness of a number of emerging market 
sovereign issuers.  The results of these studies are presented in table 7.2.   
 
 




•  GDP per capita 
•  GDP growth rate 
•  Inflation rate 
•  Debt ratios 
o  Debt/GDP 
o  Debt/Exports 
•  Debt service ratios (e.g debt service/GDP) 
•  International reserves 




Source: Rowland (2004). 
 
 
Together, table 7.1 and 7.2 give us a good understanding of which variables drive the 
Colombian sovereign spread in the short as well as in the long term.  These sets of 
variables should give both investors and Colombian policy makers a group of indicators 
to which they should pay special attention. 
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One interesting observation is that none of these studies have concluded that the fiscal 
deficit is significant in determining the sovereign spread.  The fiscal deficit is often cited 
as an important variable both by bank analysts and by credit rating agencies when 
analysing the creditworthiness of a country.  It is, however, failing to turn up as a 
significant explanatory variable in the estimations in these studies, and this result is, in 
fact, in line with most other empirical studies.  The finding might, nevertheless, reflect 
endogeneity in fiscal policy.  Countries trying to improve their credit standing may opt 
for more conservative fiscal policies, and in some cases they might have a limit on their 
fiscal deficit imposed by, for example, the International Monetary Fund.  This might be a 
plausible explanation to why the fiscal deficit might not show a systematic relationship 
with the spread, although rating agencies and investors may assign substantial weight to 
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Appendix: The Rating Systems of S&P and Moody’s 
 
Table A.1.  The rating systems of Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s 
 
Rating 
S&P         Moody’s 







Aaa  Bonds, which are Aaa, are judged to be of the best quality.  They carry the smallest degree of 
investment risk and are generally referred to as "gilt edged." Interest payments are protected by a 
large or by an exceptionally stable margin and principal is secure.  While the various protective 
elements are likely to change, such changes as can be visualized are most unlikely to impair the 






Bonds, which are rated Aa, are judged to be of high quality by all standards.  Together with the 
Aaa group they comprise what are generally known as highgrade bonds.  They are rated lower 
than the best bonds because margins of protection may not be as large as in Aaa securities or 
fluctuation of protective elements may be of greater amplitude or there may be other elements 






Bonds, which are rated A, possess many favourable investment attributes and are to be 
considered as upper-medium-grade obligations.  Factors giving security to principal and interest 
are considered adequate, but elements may be present which suggest a susceptibility to 







Bonds, which are rated Baa, are considered as medium-grade obligations (i.e., they are neither 
highly protected nor poorly secured).  Interest payments and principal security appear adequate 
for the present but certain protective elements may be lacking or may be characteristically 
unreliable over any great length of time.  Such bonds lack outstanding investment characteristics 








Bonds, which are rated Ba, are judged to have speculative elements; their future cannot be 
considered as well assured.  Often the protection of interest and principal payments may be very 
moderate, and thereby not well safeguarded during both good and bad times over the future.  






Bonds, which are rated B, generally lack characteristics of the desirable investment.  Assurance 
of interest and principal payments or of maintenance of other terms of the contract over any long 






Bonds, which are rated Caa, are of poor standing.  Such issues may be in default or there may be 
present elements of danger with respect to principal or interest. 
CC 
 
Ca  Bonds, which are rated Ca, represent obligations, which are speculative in a high degree.  Such 
issues are often in default or have other marked shortcomings. 
C C Bonds, which are rated C, are the lowest rated class of bonds, and issues so rated can be regarded 
as having extremely poor prospects of ever attaining any real investment standing. 
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